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An Evaluation Model for NonGovernmental Organizations Engaged in
Advocacy
NATHALIE DES ROSIERS*
The article proposes a model to evaluate the effectiveness of NGOs that engage in advocacy
for compliance with international human rights and civil liberties standards or constitutional
rules. The model draws on the analysis of social movement effectiveness, ombudsmen’s
roles and the literature on the evaluation of human rights NGOs at the international level. It
establishes ways to measure the legitimacy and effectiveness of advocacy NGOs. In particular,
it suggests that transparency and independence must be constantly demonstrated, that
factual accuracy must always be sought and that legal compliance must be shown to have
moral and public interest resonance. The article also discusses the choices between short
term and long term strategies.
&HW DUWLFOH SURSRVH XQ PRG«OH SHUPHWWDQW GÙ¬YDOXHU OÙHIéFDFLW¬ GHV 21* VÙRFFXSDQW GH OD
défense des droits en ce qui a trait au respect des normes internationales sur les droits
humains et les libertés civiles ou des règles constitutionnelles. Ce modèle procède de l’étude
GHOÙHIéFDFLW¬GHVPRXYHPHQWVVRFLDX[GXU·OHGHOHXURPEXGVPDQHWGHODGRFXPHQWDWLRQ
relative à l’évaluation des ONG s’occupant de la défense des droits humains sur la scène
LQWHUQDWLRQDOH,OFU¬HGHVPR\HQVGÙ¬YDOXHUODO¬JLWLPLW¬HWOÙHIéFDFLW¬GHV21*VÙRFFXSDQW
de la défense des droits. Il suggère en particulier qu’en tout temps, ces ONG doivent faire
SUHXYHGHWUDQVSDUHQFHHWGÙLQG¬SHQGDQFHUHFKHUFKHUOÙH[DFWLWXGHGHVIDLWVHWVÙDVVXUHUTXH
leur respect des lois s’accorde à l’intérêt moral et public. Cet article discute également du
FKRL[HQWUHGHVVWUDW¬JLHV£FRXUWRX£ORQJWHUPHV
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IN DECEMBER 2012, MCGILL UNIVERSITY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED that it had
developed a protocol to regulate protests on its campus. Some students and
faculty members sent the protocol to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association
(the CCLA). The CCLA sent the university a letter detailing why, in its view, the
policy unreasonably undermined freedom of expression.1 The letter was made
public, and the next day the university announced that it was withdrawing its
policy. Many factors could explain why it did so, but the students and faculty
members who had communicated with the CCLA felt that the letter had an
influence.2
In early 2012, the Canadian government tabled the Protecting Children from
Internet Predators Act, which increased police officers’ powers to obtain the name,
and possibly address, of individuals behind Internet URLs.3 A large civil society
campaign aimed at stopping the bill began. Privacy Commissioners and advocacy
groups spoke against it; advertisements against the bill were placed on TV and

1.

2.
3.

A copy of the letter to McGill is available on the website of the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association, see online: <http://ccla.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2013-0108-PDF-Letter-to-McGill-re-draft-protocol.pdf>.
At the time of writing, the issue continued to preoccupy students and faculty. Another
attempt to regulate protests was underway.
Bill C-30, An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications
Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012 (first reading 13
February 2012). The bill did not proceed past first reading.
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YouTube. The adoption of the bill was deferred and was eventually stalled. The
public pressure had an influence.
Examples abound of reversals of policy due to public outcry or to the actions
of civil society advocacy groups. There are also many examples of such voices
being completely ignored. In this article, I examine the role of civil society
advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Canadian context and
assess their effectiveness. Although some aspects of human rights advocacy in
Canada have been subjects of academic discussion, an assessment of the potential
value of advocacy NGOs has not been fully developed. This article aims to lay
the foundations for a model to assess and compare more effectively different
organizations, actions, and strategies.
I am particularly pleased to provide this work in the context of the celebration
of the career of John McCamus. This article is an homage to McCamus that aims
to highlight his immense contribution to access to justice and, in particular, to
the CCLA. McCamus has been a member of the board of CCLA for the last
thirty years and has chaired its meetings for the last twenty. In this capacity,
he has ensured the survival and the sustainability of an association that devotes
itself to the protection of civil liberties and democratic values in Canada. It is
no exaggeration to say that, without McCamus, the association would have
dwindled away when money was tight and energy was low.
Despite his busy life and extraordinary accomplishments in other fields,
McCamus was able to find the time to lead the organization, gently ensuring
that board members reached consistent decisions and conducted themselves
appropriately. He found the energy to help recruit and support staff members
and served as counsel in many breach of privacy cases. Over the years, I was
able to observe how much his fairness and decency, combined with his ability
to listen and de-escalate conflicts, helped the CCLA. We all are indebted to his
work, support, and good judgment. Because McCamus has a profound sense of
how institutions should be governed, how to guide without interfering, and how
to inspire without crushing creativity, an article on the governance and good
performance of advocacy organizations is appropriate to celebrate his legacy.
This article is divided into three parts. In Part I, I posit briefly the need for and
role of advocacy NGOs in a democracy such as Canada. I then move in Part II to
review different evaluation models proposed for social movements, ombudsmen,
and human rights NGOs. The purpose is to identify a range of criteria associated
with evaluation of groups or people with influence. This inventory of evaluation
measures leads me to propose, in Part III, a model to assess human rights and
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civil liberties NGOs in a Canadian, as opposed to international, context.4 This
paper does not address whether human rights advocacy that draws on legal norms
or constitutional compliance presents particular challenges. The questions I ask
here are how we know whether an organization did the “right thing”; what model
can support a performance assessment of an organization; what success looks like
for a national human rights organization; and how we can measure it.
The enterprise may seem daunting. Many doubt the effectiveness of
NGOs. As Peter R. Baehr recently concluded, “Despite the abundance of
non-governmental human rights organizations little is actually known about
their effectiveness or impact, except for the fact that they tend to rely on what
is commonly known as the ‘mobilization of shame’.”5 He concluded that there
was no evidence that NGOs had any real influence and that everything could
be explained by happenstance or a variety of other factors. Scott Calnan has
attempted to challenge this negative assessment.6 His model provides some
answers, though he relies mostly on the ability of domestic NGOs to implement
international human rights obligations and his theory has not been applied to
Canadian NGOs. I attempt here to flesh out an account that would modestly
support evaluative frameworks for advocacy NGOs.

4.

5.
6.

The subject has been discussed mostly at the international level. See Claude E Welch, ed,
NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2001); Caroline E Schwitter Marsiaj, The Role of International NGOs in the Global
Governance of Human Rights: Challenging the Democratic Deficit (Zurich, CH: Schulthess,
2004).
Peter R Baehr, Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations in International Relations
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) at 123.
Scott Calnan, The Effectiveness of Domestic Human Rights NGOs: A Comparative Study
(Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008).
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I. THE NEED FOR AN ADVOCACY SECTOR
Most democratic countries aspire to abide by the rule of law7 and to ensure that
“all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself,
are accountable to laws … .”8 Mechanisms to prevent abuses of power are deemed
necessary in that context. This certainly requires an independent judiciary and
a vigorous, independent, and courageous bar. However, there is no doubt that a
civil society’s commitment to refuse to accept injustices and abuses of power is
essential to a continued obedience to the rule of law. A mature democracy aims
to create sufficient incentives within its governance culture to prevent, identify,
and correct abuses on a routine and systematic basis. Advocacy groups work in
the interstices between democratic aspirations, the realities of day-to-day life, and
the pressures and temptations of power.
No doubt an independent bar, able and willing to take on difficult cases to
denounce injustices and uphold the rule of law, is crucial. However, many people
do not even recognize that they have suffered an injustice or that their rights have
been breached. People often internalize oppression to such a degree that they are
unable to imagine a different life, a different outcome, or a different treatment.9
7.

8.
9.

There is a large critical assessment of the rule of law in modern legal theory. See for
example the theory advanced in Luc Tremblay, The Rule of Law, Justice and Interpretation
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997). The term itself is subject to numerous
interpretations. As Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo suggest: “The semantic complexity of
the notion of ‘rule of law’ is not a recent phenomenon. … It is a notion connected with
political and legal projects and conflicts; it carries an intrinsic plurality of meanings, and is
value-laden and ideologically momentous.” Pietro Costa, Danilo Zolo & Emilio Santoro,
The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (Dordrecht, NL: Springer, 2007) at x. In
the present context, I use the expression “rule of law” in what Luc Tremblay describes as
the orthodox view, that is, the positivist view of law. However, my claim is that democratic
commitment to the rule of law demands an assessment of how laws are lived on the ground,
how abuses are perpetrated, and how values of justice and equality are subverted, which is
where NGOs often act. In that sense, it is compatible with Tremblay’s “rule of law as justice”
theory.
Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, UNSOR, 2004, S/2004/616.
The well-known language of “capabilities” was developed by Amartya Sen. See Amartya
Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). See also
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999). Development as Freedom
is useful to understand how the language of rights does not always capture the full extent
of human suffering. Oppressed people may rationally opt not to ask for what is constantly
denied to them and make due with less. The ideas of Sen have been used widely. See, for
example, Martha C Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006).
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In these circumstances they will not call a lawyer. Further, at times, the legal
world may not have given a name or a remedy to an injustice, or may be unable
to frame that injustice as a legal question. Finally, the lawyer’s ethical construct
forces her to represent an individual client to the best of her abilities. This
individualized approach may isolate poor and powerless people from each other,
compound their sense of vulnerability, and contribute, at times, to a misdiagnosis
of widespread bad management as individual mistake.10
Advocacy groups often emerge to take on systemic cases, to advocate in
the courts, in the media, and in the public, and to strengthen the capacity of
marginalized persons to speak and demand better treatment. In a context
of the access-to-justice crisis that faces many societies, where the traditional
legal services on offer do not begin to address the demand or meet the need
for justice,11 the role of advocacy should be strengthened. The debates on
access to justice often downplay or ignore the role of advocacy groups. One
might presume that access-to-justice solutions begin at the point at which an
individual seeks information, formulates a question, makes a claim, identifies
a justiciable problem, reaches out to a lawyer, or appears at the courthouse.
The failure of the judicial system to respond adequately to all such needs must
certainly be addressed, but a democracy should aim to address larger problems of
accountability that can be invisible to an individual claimant. The identification
of systemic failures cannot be relegated only to the political arena; it must also
be claimed and framed as a legal problem.12 For example, reducing injustices
through improving accountability should be part of an access-to-justice agenda.
No matter the strength of the bar’s commitment to pro bono work and to creative

10. Steven Wexler, “Practicing Law for the Poor” (1970) 79:6 Yale LJ 1049. Wexler’s seminal
article has influenced the development of clinical legal education and the often problematic
use of litigation to advance claims in contexts of serious deprivations. See also Gary Bellow,
“Steady Work: A Practitioners Reflections on Political Lawyering” (1996) 31:2 Harv
CR-CLL Rev 297.
11. Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, online: Canadian Forum
on Civil Justice <http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/action-committee#NAC>. See also, the Canadian
Bar Association, Envisioning Equal Justice Project, online: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/
Access/main>.
12. Pearl Eliadis, “Inscribing Charter Values in Policy Processes” in Sheila McIntrye & Sanda
Rodgers, eds, Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2006); Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Frein, moteur et levier:
le droit à l’égalité, les droits économiques et sociaux et le développement des politiques
publiques au Canada” in Sheila McIntyre and Sanda Rodgers, Diminishing Returns, Inequality
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (Toronto, ON: Butterworths, 2007),
213-27.
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ways of financing legal challenges, there is a need for advocacy groups to articulate
claims that aim to speak “truth to power.” How we assess their performance is the
subject of this article.

II. EVALUATION MODELS FOR THE ADVOCACY SECTOR
In this section, I explore different models that have emerged to assess performance,
seeking criteria to determine how a good advocacy group should function. After
briefly looking at the criteria usually associated with the assessment of social
movements, I examine the way in which another form of advocacy—namely,
the ombudsman function—has been evaluated, before reviewing the literature
on the assessment of NGOs, which relates mostly to the international context.
My choice of models requires explanation. Why look at social movements,
which seem so contingent on political contexts? What can the review of an
ombudsman’s performance tell us about advocacy NGOs? Would it not be
sufficient to focus on the ways in which NGOs have been studied and criticized?
My analysis considers the advocacy function to see whether there are constant
themes that emerge from a performance analysis of social actors that do not
have the power to impose their views. It is in this context that I first examine
social movements that have exercised influence and created change. My question
is whether the critical analysis of social movements can help in developing
an assessment framework for advocacy NGOs. For the same reason, I look at
ombudsmen models, which also aim to create change despite the office’s lack of
binding power. Finally, I review the literature on NGO assessment, which has
been more abundant in the context of international NGOs.
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CHANGE

The study of social movements is very rich. Their contentious history and varied
evolution invite evaluation and theorization. The focus of this section is the
evaluation of the successes and failures of social movements. I have attempted to
discern patterns and criteria that could stimulate a comparative analysis in the
context of attempting to develop an evaluation framework for advocacy NGOs.
As detailed below, there is often a linkage between advocacy NGOs and the social
movements from which they emerge. In the present section, I am less interested
in exploring these linkages than in looking at the evaluation criteria that have
been used to measure the success of social movements. My goal is to create an
inventory of criteria that could be applied to NGOs.
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The evaluative framework for social movements is grounded in the
practicalities of political achievements and relies on a dynamic analysis of a
multitude of factors. Assessment is difficult because no social movement is good
or bad: movements occur and some succeed or are perceived to have succeeded,
while others do not. The characteristics of a successful movement may not be
able to be reproduced elsewhere and the “success” label is often controversial.
Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned.
The traditional and most often used definition of a social movement is given
by Charles Tilly,13 and includes:
1. A sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on
target audiences;
2. The employment of combinations from among the following
forms of political action: creation of special purpose associations
and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies,
demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media,
and pamphleteering; call the variable ensemble of performances the
social-movement repertoire; and,
3. Participants’ concerted public representations of worthiness, unity,
numbers and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their
constituencies.
Different theories attempt to explain the success or failure of various social
movements. Many social movements have been analyzed in detail: from the civil
rights movement, to the feminist movement, to the gay and lesbian liberation
movement; more recently, the anti-globalization movement and the Occupy
movement have been the subject of much discussion.14
At the same time, many advocacy NGOs can trace their birth to the actions
of a social movement. Hence, the relationship of some NGOs to the founding
movement is both a source of pride and comfort, as well as a limitation. Does
the death of the movement imply the irrelevance of the NGO? Is the NGO the
embodiment of the promises of the movement? Is the NGO accountable to the
13. Social Movements, 1768–2004 (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2004) at 53. See also Mayer N Zald,
“Making Change: Why Does the Social Sector Need Social Movements?” (2004) 2:1 Stan
Soc Innovation Rev 25 at 28; Max De Pree, Leading without Power: Finding Hope in Serving
Community (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1997) at 21-32.
14. See generally Miriam Smith, ed, Group Politics and Social Movements in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007); William K Carroll, “Social Movements and
Counterhegemony: Canadian Contexts and Social Theories” in William K Carroll, ed,
Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, 2d (Toronto:
Garamond Press, 1997) at 3-38.
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movement? Should it be a catalyst for other social movements? For example,
many civil liberties organizations were born in the 1960s and can claim that
they are linked to the civil rights movements of that decade. Their continued
relevance must be reasserted as some of the initial demands of better human
rights instruments have arguably been met. For example, the initial demands
from civil liberties groups included abolition of art censorship and abolition of
the death penalty. In the context where the demands have been met in terms of
legal reforms, the group may have to move to other objectives to reignite the
support that initial claims had. As we will see, which issue the NGO selects will
be relevant to an assessment of its performance.15
Charles Dobson has summarized the range of success indicators for social
movements in his Citizens Handbook.16 His work is highly practical and is useful
for our purposes as he attempts to determine “what works” for a social movement.
Many of the criteria that he highlights can be found in Tilly’s assessment: notably,
success indicators for social movements tend to focus on the ability to establish a
moral claim, which often will require a “reframing exercise.”17 A second indicator
is the ability to regroup a sufficiently large number of people prepared to commit
time and energy. Some argue that access to resources—that is, networks, elite
approbation, financial resources, and access to decision-makers—is also key.
Finally, the role of leadership is debated. Some argue that a charismatic figure is
essential, while others downplay the importance of personality over membership
commitment.18 These four criteria—a moral claim, committed membership,
access to resources, and leadership—are generally regarded as the main factors
in assessing the success of a social movement.19 Failures are deemed to stem
from cooptation or “symbolic reassurance,”20 fatigue, or direct annihilation by
opposing forces. Repression does work.
Dobson’s analysis is relevant for our purposes. If, as Dobson argues, morally
grounded claims matter, the assessment of NGOs should reflect such criteria.
Advocacy couched in moral terms aims to appeal to higher ideals of the human
15. See Calnan, supra note 6, which speaks to assessing the “agenda” of the NGO and its
relevance to international human rights priorities.
16. The Citizen’s handbook is available online. See: <http://www.citizenshandbook.org>.
17. Tilly uses “worthiness.” See Tilly, supra note 13.
18. This assessment comes largely from an interesting article from Charles Dobson. See Charles
Dobson, “Social Movements: A summary of what works” in The Citizen’s Handbook: A Guide
to Community Organizing (Vancouver: Vancouver Citizen’s Committee, August 2001),
online: <http://www.citizenshandbook.org/movements.pdf>.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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spirit. To the extent that advocacy NGOs claim that their mandate is rooted
in law, they are making the assumption that unconstitutionality, or illegality, is
immoral. At times, the simple assertion of illegality or immorality will not be
sufficient. It is often necessary to explain why illegal actions are immoral. Some
rules or laws may be immoral, unworkable, or unconstitutional. At times, the
public is ambivalent about the morality of some legal obligations. For example,
in the context of police chasing dangerous criminals or attempting to uncover
terrorist plots, the claim that police action is “illegal” or “unconstitutional” has
resonance, but may need to be grounded in broader appeals to humanity. Fear
may lead a society to accept and tolerate illegality because it is under the illusion
that this will guarantee safety or because it has learned to devalue the humanity
of the alleged terrorist or criminal. If Dobson is right, the constant search to
strike the right chord in moral terms should be an important element in assessing
NGOs.
The second success criterion is the commitment of its membership. Although
commitment may be difficult to evaluate objectively, a large cadre of volunteers
or a smaller long-time and very active group of members is a positive indicator
and suggests that NGO management should foster the commitment of members.
Dobson also mentions access to political resources. He suggests that the
ability to reach out to elites and to large membership bases is key, along with
the ability to mobilize financial resources. This organizational aspect of NGOs
is worth investigating in an assessment of their worth. We will see that Calnan
also makes the claim that organizational health is relevant to the effectiveness of
NGOs.
The fourth criterion, which appears more debated, is the link to a charismatic
leader. Many NGOs identify with a leadership figure, particularly in the context
of media appeal. Alan Borovoy for the CCLA, David Suzuki for the David Suzuki
Foundation, and Maud Barlow for the Council of Canadians, are examples
of charismatic leaders who highlight the effectiveness of the organizations.
Finally, Dobson argues that cooptation is a danger that constantly lurks in the
dynamic of political positioning. This may be a fruitful avenue of research in
assessing how advocacy NGOs relate to their targets and how they maintain their
independence and ability to criticize while themselves attempting to achieve a
level of cooperation to foster implementation.
This short review of success criteria from the social movement literature
suggests that messaging, organizational strength, access to resources broadly
defined, and leadership are meaningful criteria to assess NGOs. In addition, a
failure indicator, that is, the possibility of being coopted, should also be included
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in our assessment. I now move to review the way in which the effectiveness of
ombudsmen has been evaluated.
A. OMBUDSMEN AND INFLUENCE

Ombudsmen have occupied a cherished place in the Canadian legal landscape
for many decades. Canada has often opted for an ombudsman model at various
levels of government to strengthen its democracy. Ombudsmen are created by
governments or institutions to respond to complaints. They do not have binding
power. They simply have the power to make recommendations. Therefore,
the essence of the ombudsman is his or her capacity to exert influence on
administrative processes. Ombudsmen make recommendations and hope to be
listened to. In that sense, like NGOs, they seek to influence.
In her series of interviews with various ombudsmen, Michelle Le Baron
identifies the roles of the “classical” ombudsman; raising the bar for service to
the public; articulating and fostering best practices; encouraging government
agencies to offer a spectrum of services with appropriate dispute prevention and
resolution mechanisms; reporting on the general landscape of issues including
substantive, procedural and relational dimensions; promoting confidence in
governance structures and processes; providing access to justice, especially for
those who have limited access to resources for redress; commenting on systemic
issues, especially those where social justice may be compromised; and holding
government accountable for the accessibility and workability of its policies and
avenues for citizen engagement.21
My sense is that, in Canada, the growth of the governmental ombudsman
function may have led to a reduction in funding or support for the
non-governmental advocacy sector. This contrasts with the United States, for
example, where the financial support for various NGOs is more established. Is
it necessary to have an organization devoted to privacy concerns if there is a
statutory Privacy Commissioner? Is the function of this organization simply to
ensure good performance of the governmental actor and appropriate support
for its recommendations? Does the presence of a governmental advocacy actor
weaken or otherwise affect the non-governmental advocacy sector in Canada? If
so, does this change the role and the assessment of an NGO’s performance? These
questions warrant further research.
21. Michelle Le Baron, “Watchdogs and Wise Ones in Winter Lands: The Practice Spectrum
of Canadian Ombudsman” Forum of Canadian Ombudsmen (2008), online: <http://www.
ombudsmanforum.ca/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Liz%20Hoffman%20Paper%20
2009%20%28Eng%29.pdf>.
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Commentators on the roles of ombudsmen usually emphasize their
democratic worth,22 although they recognize the difficulty of providing a definitive
assessment.23 Isabelle Fortier talks about sustaining democratic functions of
redress, integrity, and accountability.24 At times, ombudsmen have been created
to protect particular values such as integrity, financial accuracy, protection of
official languages, or protection of the environment. Ombudsmen in that context
aim to embody a value often forgotten in the busy world of politics. From the
poignant question as to whether “trees should have standing”25 has come the
realization that some intangible values must be anthropomorphized—given a
human face—to be heard and considered. I use the term “Value Ombudsman”
to describe the ombudsmen who function in defense of a particular legislative
objective, such as privacy, access to information, whistleblower protection, or
bilingualism, as opposed to the more general ombudsmen who are empowered
to act for good administrative governance. Value Ombudsmen have a specialized
perspective: They speak for a particular aspect of public governance and act to
raise awareness, convince others, reframe debates, ask for accountability, and
empower individuals and groups to ask for better treatment26—all of which are
actions often performed by NGOs.
This functional similarity is not completely fortuitous: both NGOs and
ombudsmen can leverage moral powers in a search for justice or constitutional
compliance, and both can be ignored. The ombudsman is paid by government
and so may have more resources and easier access to government information.
However, the literature on the ombudsman provides further indicia of
measurement for the enigmatic and elusive influence that advocacy NGOs strive
to exert. Ombudsmen have no enforcement or disciplinary powers and they
generally depend on the power of persuasion: “They are an interface, practicing
22. See Gregory J Levine, “Administrative Justice and the Ombudsman—Concepts and Codes
in British Columbia and Ontario” (2004) 17:3 C J Admin L & Prac 239. See also Stewart
Hyson, “The Ombudsman Research Project” Canadian Political Science Association (2006),
online: <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Hyson.pdf>.
23. Brenda Danet, “Toward a Method to Evaluate the Ombudsman Role” (1978) 10:3 Admin &
Soc 340-42.
24. Isabelle Fortier, “Multiple roles of Ombudsmen in fostering democratic values: Evolution
and emergent issues of the Québec’s provincial Ombudsman 2000-2006” Forum of Canadian
Ombudsmen, online: < http://www.ombudsmanforum.ca/en/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/
isabelle_fortier_democratic_values_e.pdf>.
25. Christopher D Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? And Other Essays on Law, Morals and the
Environment (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1996).
26. Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Balance and Values – The Multiple Roles of the Ombudsmen” Forum
of Canadian Ombudsmen, online: <http://www.ombudsmanforum.ca/en/?p=561>.
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dynamic in-between-ness in ways that promote voice, procedural satisfaction
and accountability.”27 Indeed, Daniel Jacoby and Patrick Robardet have used the
expression “change agent”28 to describe the work of ombudsmen.
The many roles of ombudsmen come from the diversity of mandates and
missions as well as the diversity of personalities that have occupied the various
positions.29 Nevertheless, a form of administrative advocacy has resulted from the
strategies deployed by ombudsmen. This administrative advocacy is helpful to
consider in assessing the value of advocacy NGOs. Most agree that independence
is the core value of ombudsmen’s appeal.30 Effectiveness is measured by the
capacity to effect change that leads to improvement. André Marin certainly
suggests that the real measure of effectiveness is the capacity to concentrate on an
issue that affects a large number of people and to focus more on systemic issues
and less on individual mistakes.31
This review suggests that three criteria have been identified in assessing the
effectiveness of ombudsmen. First, their independence is viewed as key. Second is
the credibility or prestige either of the individual ombudsman or the office itself.
Third, some suggest that the real measure of effectiveness is the ability of the
ombudsman to change the culture of government, to focus on systemic as opposed
to individual complaints, or to strengthen the internal capacity of government
to correct its mistakes without recourse to external complaint mechanisms. As
Martin Oosting quips: “The better the government functions, and the greater the
effectiveness of these internal complaints procedures, the less the ombudsman
will have to do. But is it not precisely the task of each ombudsman to try to put
himself (sic) out of a job?”32
These three criteria should be relevant to the assessment of an NGO. Its
capacity to assert and demonstrate independence from the targets or subjects
of its action and criticism, be they government, police services, or large
corporations, is imperative. Such independence gives an NGO status and makes

27. Le Baron, supra note 21.
28. Daniel Jacoby and Patrick Robardet, “The Protecteur du Ctioyen du Québec as an Agent of
Change” (1993) 11 The Ombudsman Journal 113.
29. Le Baron, supra note 21 at 6.
30. Ibid at 24.
31. André Marin, “Vital Watchdog vs. Paper Tiger: What kind of ombudsman do you
want to be?” Forum of the Canadian Ombudsman (29 May 2008), online: <http://www.
ombudsmanforum.ca/en/?p=400>.
32. Marten Oosting, “The Ombudsman and his Environment: A global view” in Linda C Reif,
ed, The International Ombudsman Anthology (The Hague, NL: Kluwer Law International,
1999) at para 9 at 13.
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its recommendations worthwhile. Second, the credibility of the organization or
of the person leading it, like the credibility of the ombudsman’s office or of the
individual ombudsman, may also warrant some attention. Finally, the ability
to focus on issues that are transformative of the culture of government is a
thought-provoking assessment tool. For example, on this criterion, it might be
more profitable to take a case to improve police disciplinary processes than to
argue for the exclusion of evidence in yet another police misconduct case, no
matter how outrageous the misconduct may be.
The ombudsmen literature discloses criteria that complement the social
movement literature in predictable ways. An ombudsman’s office is created and
imbued with credibility because of its creation. It has access to some resources
by virtue of its governmental or institutional position, which makes access
to resources a less salient assessment criterion for ombudsmen than for social
movements. Social movements, by contrast, emerge from grassroots community
engagement and are far less organized and stable. Their success requires that they
discipline themselves to access resources broadly defined. On the other hand,
the ombudsman cannot count on membership or numbers of adherents, and
he or she is dependent on the government’s rather amorphous sense that the
recommendations he or she makes ought to be followed. The recommendations
of an ombudsman may not catch the public’s imagination—he or she cannot
organize a street demonstration or engage in collective mobilization in the same
way that a social movement tends to do. NGOs can be perceived as falling between
these two poles: they may be more permanent and more organized than a large,
fluid social movement, but less structured and stable than an ombudsman’s office.
How, then, should they be assessed?
B. ASSESSING NGOS’ WORTH

The variety of NGOs makes uniform rules for evaluation and assessment difficult:
some NGOs pressure businesses and governments, deliver services, and empower
the poor and the disenfranchised, while others are watchdogs that comment
on governmental action or inaction. Nevertheless, a few authors have proposed
models to critically evaluate the role of NGOs. Most of this work has taken place
in the international sphere. International donors are increasingly demanding that
NGOs demonstrate not only clarity of purpose and transparency in spending,
but also efficiency and effectiveness in their programming. These demands have
framed certain discussions, which have also been sparked by concerns over NGOs’
democratic deficit and their inclusion in international decision-making forums.
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In response to criticisms that NGOs are at risk of usurping the positions
of democratic institutions, scholars have developed models to discuss the
legitimacy of NGOs that assume greater powers and are invited to participate
in international negotiations.33 The questions addressed include whether or
not NGOs would replace democratically elected state governments in devising
policies, and whether they would hinder or add value to international negotiations.
Underlying the questions about NGOs’ utility is the eternal debate about their
authority, democratically speaking: who are they to claim such power? Even
before discussing their worth or performance, NGOs must claim legitimacy.
1.

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy has often been discussed in the context of human rights organizations.
In the United States, an entire industry has arisen around NGO assessment.34
Groups such as Charity Navigator and the American Institute of Philanthropy
evaluate thousands of charities. For the most part, however, these ratings groups
have stayed away from substantive measures of legitimacy, preferring instead to
measure charities according to independence in governance, transparency, and
financial efficiency.35
To understand the discussions regarding legitimacy, it is important to start
with the nature of NGOs. Interestingly, the multiple definitions of NGOs reflect
the different missions that NGOs adopt. A workshop held at the Asian Institute
of Technology in 1988 used a following list, which included the following criteria
to determine which organizations were NGOs, among others:
• A non profit-making, voluntary, service-oriented/developmentoriented organization, either for the benefit of members (a grassroots
organization) or of other members of the population (an agency).
• It is an organization of private individuals who believe in certain
basic social principles and who structure their activities to bring
about development to communities that they are servicing. …
33. See Vivien Collingwood, “Non-governmental organizations, power and legitimacy in
international society” (2006) 32:3 Rev of Int Stud 439; Ian Clark, “Legitimacy in the Global
Order” (2003) 29 Rev of Int Stud 75.
34. Carl Bialik, “Charity Rankings Giveth Less Than Meets the Eye”, The Wall Street Journal (19
December 2008) online: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122963299671419401.html>;
Carl Bialik, “Evaluating Charity Evaluations” The Wall Street Journal (18 December 2008)
online: <http://blogs.wsj.com/numbersguy/evaluating-the-charity-evaluators-478/>.
35. Carolina Preston, “Making a Measurable Difference” The Chronicle of
Philanthropy (13 November 2008) online: <http://philanthropy.com/article/
Making-a-Measurable-Difference/57560/>.

904

(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

•

An independent, democratic, non-setarian peope’s [sic] organization
working for the empowerment of economic and/or socially
marginalized groups. …
• Organizations established by and for the community without or
with little intervention from the government; they are not only
a charity organization, but work on socio-economic-cultural
activities. … .36
The World Bank uses a more restrictive definition: “[P]rivate organizations
that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor,
protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community
development.”37
It is interesting to review these definitions because they are essentially
functional in nature: NGOs are what they aim to do. Their key identifying feature
is that they are not government, even if they receive funding, speak to, or work
with or for governments. This functional approach almost blends the question of
legitimacy with that of efficiency; NGOs are who they are because of what they
do. Indeed, many authors explicitly recognize that NGOs’ legitimacy comes from
their commitment to their mission. Some authors venture to say that NGOs are
political corporations with no less or more legitimacy than any private sector
corporation;38 only their power and influence make them popular or important
in public discussions. In that context, the legitimacy question is irrelevant–NGOs
are legitimate because they exist. The political market determines whether they
have power or influence, but they are all legitimate.
Others accept that the concerns over the legitimacy of NGOs are well placed
and that NGOs must prove their legitimacy. How they do it and what criteria
they use are the questions. The debate over legitimacy has focused on additional
demands for the accountability of NGOs—that they be more like government, in
the sense of being constrained by elections, limited by constitutions, and subject
to ouster when unpopular. Many authors debate whether the comparison with
the state is useful or needed, and insist on a rather different analysis for NGO’s
legitimacy. As Vivien Collingwood points out, “The argument that NGOs are
not democratic because they are not formally representative, or do not allow
36. “Definitions of an NGO” The Global Development Research Centre, online: <www.gdrc.org/
ngo/wb-define.html>.
37. Operations Policy Department, World Bank, “Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to
Operational Collaboration between The World Bank and Non-governmental Organizations”
(1995) at 7.
38. Robert Blood, “Should NGOs be viewed as ‘political corporations’?” (2004) 9:2 J of Comm
Management 120.
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direct participation of stakeholders in decision-making, displays, at best, a failure
of political imagination, and at worst, a desire to misrepresent how transnational
NGOs actually function.”39
There is no doubt that legitimacy is often assumed. There are sociological
and normative aspects to legitimacy: institutions are legitimate because people
believe them to be and because they seek to gain and preserve such legitimacy by
observing certain rules and values in their work.40 Nevertheless, a deconstruction
of the ways in which legitimacy is assumed, assigned, or claimed is useful. For
example, in the context of advocacy organizations, Hugo Slim suggests that
legitimacy might be defined as “the particular status with which an organisation
is imbued and perceived at any given time that enables it to operate with the general
consent of peoples, governments, companies and non-state groups around the world.”41
According to Slim, “legitimacy is both derived and generated. It is derived
from morality and law. It is generated by veracity, tangible support and more
intangible goodwill.”42 Slim’s work confronts the legitimacy question directly.
In his understanding, legitimacy also stems from an NGO’s ability to ground
its mandate in legal commitments to human rights and in the duty of every
human being to protect human rights. Slim is not the only author to see a linkage
to law as generating legitimacy. Collingwood, for example, also suggests that
international treaties act as the source of the moral claims asserted by NGOs.43
Other important elements of legitimacy have also been identified. Financial
transparency and political independence, for example, have been suggested
as a source of legitimacy in the international context. Many NGOs criticize
governments and emphasize their impartiality and non-partisanship in doing
so.44 Extensive membership is also perceived as a source of legitimacy as it is seen
as a proxy for organizational expertise and access to networks or partnerships.45
The debate over legitimacy is somewhat unique to NGOs, because social
movements or ombudsmen rarely have to assert their legitimacy. Whereas social
movements “are” and therefore must be reckoned with, ombudsmen have been

39. Collingwood, supra note 33 at 451.
40. Ibid at 454.
41. Hugo Slim, “By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-Governmental
Organisations” The Global Development Research Centre (2002), online: http://www.gdrc.org/
ngo/accountability/by-what-authority.html [emphasis in original].
42. Ibid.
43. Collingwood, supra note 33 at 447.
44. Ibid at 448.
45. Ibid.
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granted legitimacy through legislative mandates. It will be important to consider
the question of legitimacy in the assessment model to be developed.
2.

THE DEBATE OVER EFFECTIVENESS

Another important debate that arises from the literature pertains to the effectiveness
of NGOs. Led by donors, this debate stresses that scarce philanthropic resources
should be allocated rationally, and asks whether better indicators should be
developed to make sense of the different claims made by NGOs as they seek to
obtain funding. This discussion is also helpful because it invites debates about the
measurement of effectiveness and ways in which human rights advancements can
be monitored. Strategies of engagement vary among NGOs: direct delivery of
services warrants a different analysis than advocacy for legal or political change.
For the purposes of this article, I primarily identify and examine the strategies
developed by advocacy organizations.
Collingwood identifies strategies of “dialogue and discussion, formal advice,
agreement of voluntary codes and standards, and independent monitoring
schemes.”46 In her view, innovation is a hallmark of efficiency. She also notes
that direct engagement with private and public actors has helped to bolster the
perceived usefulness of NGOs. For example, developing codes of conduct to
assist private actors to engage in sound human rights practices, or publishing
annual ratings lists, may assist in creating an appetite for change or demystifying
the obstacles to change. Collingwood notes that such efforts are heavily
dependent for their success on “the extent to which the NGO is able to harness
the pressure of the media and public opinion to its cause, the extent to which
the government or organisation involved is prepared to make concessions … .”47
Some governments or organizations may be sensitive to their image and may care
that it could be tarnished by allegations of human rights violations; others may be
less sensitive to such claims. In addition, the legal enforceability of various human
rights commitments varies and NGOs’ ability to pressure governments may be
influenced by such legal uncertainty. Some governments may worry about acting
illegally or unconstitutionally, but will not be swayed by arguments that a course
of action is merely ill-advised without being illegal.
Most would accept that the failure of a government or a powerful political
actor to respond to human rights concerns cannot be the sole measure of the
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of human rights advocacy organizations. Though
political resistance to an organization’s message is not synonymous with
46. Ibid at 443.
47. Ibid at 444.
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ineffectiveness, the debate as to how to measure its effectiveness remains open.
Slim suggests a “voice accountability” model. Slim asks: if NGOs give a “voice”
to injustice and work to remedy it in individual and systemic ways, how should
they ensure that it is the right “voice,” the true voice of injustice? If NGOs aspire
to “speak truth to power” and claim moral authority to challenge governmental
or other action, how can they ensure moral legitimacy?48 Slim suggests that voice
accountability depends on legitimacy and authority. The influence of NGOs is
the real measure of their effectiveness. By influence, Slim means their ability
to articulate demands to various decision-makers and to bring about changes
despite their relative lack of resources. However, even in attempting to give voice
to injustice, issues of legitimacy arise. As Slim puts it:
The questions NGOs have asked themselves concentrate on how their voice relates
to the people they are primarily concerned about — the poor, people whose rights
are violated, and the victims of war. These debates about NGO voice might be
summed up as follows: do NGOs speak as the poor, with the poor, for the poor or about
the poor? …
How NGOs answer this question determines the precise nature of their legitimacy.
If they are an NGO or CBO (community based organisation) that is made up of
poor people or the victims of human rights violations then they can be regarded as
speaking as. If an NGO is working very closely with such people and speaks with
their consent, then they can be said to be speaking with. If — as much NGO rhetoric
declares — the poor and the oppressed are effectively unable to speak out and so
are somehow ‘voiceless’ then NGOs could claim to be speaking for or on behalf of
them. However, this last form of voice must be treated with great caution as it can
be argued that it is in the organisational interests of middle class NGO people to
keep lower class people voiceless. In other words, some voiceless-ness may be the
result of NGO oppression as well as government or other violent oppression. The
problem of northern NGOs ‘capturing’ the agenda and taking over the voice of
southern NGOs is well known. Finally, if NGOs are not strictly speaking as, with
or for a particular group of poor or victimised people, or are speaking so generally as
to make specific relationships meaningless, then they may claim to be speaking about
poverty or oppression. 49

Slim is quick to point out that many organizations speak in different modes,
that is, with, for, or about the poor and the oppressed, depending on issues or
strategies. His point is simply that these modes should be distinguished clearly
and that NGOs must be clear about which mode they offer or run the risk of
being found to be masquerading rather than to be voices for the poor and the
48. Slim, supra note 41.
49. Ibid [emphasis in original] [citation omitted].
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oppressed. From this commentary, one might reflect that integrity, transparency,
and conformity of actions to mandates are sources of legitimacy and authority.
In his work, Scott Calnan also suggests that effectiveness can be measured.
His book, The Effectiveness of Domestic Human Rights NGOs,50 seeks to evaluate the
capacity of different NGOs in the United States, UK, and Germany to implement
international human rights norms. He proposes a qualitative method that seeks
to measure several aspects of effectiveness.51 First, he attempts to gauge the way
in which the state receives, interprets, and uses the NGO’s criticisms. His second
measure, which he describes as more important, is the way in which the state is
socialized into internalizing the norms that the NGO puts forward. A successful
internalization happens when the state itself and its leaders fundamentally believe
that transgressing human rights norms is wrong. Finally, Calnan looks at the
extent to which an NGO is self-reflexive to ensure that its strategies are deployed
in an appropriate way to achieve compliance with international human rights
instruments.
Calnan’s comparative work and his evaluations of different domestic NGOs
lead him to the following conclusions that are relevant for our purposes:
1. The primary determinants of an NGO’s effectiveness are its
organizational abilities, not environmental factors; that is, even in a
negative political environment, NGOs may be effective.
2. An NGO’s organizational culture is more important than its
organizational structure (mechanical or organic) in determining the
NGO’s effectiveness. Calnan distinguishes between a mechanical
structure, which is hierarchical and bureaucratic, and an organic
one, which is easily adaptable to new environments and information.
His conclusion is that tension in organizational culture is linked to a
conflict between internal coherence and external focus. In his view,
some NGOs are too internally focused and miss opportunities for
partnerships or actions because of their self-centeredness. Others
lack identity and cannot coalesce easily around a message, have
trouble reaching decisions, or cannot develop a good image.
3. NGO tactics are generally determined by the relative pull of
legitimacy on the one hand and rational adaptation to the
environment on the other. Calnan explains that legitimacy may be
obtained at the cost of efficiency; that is, in order to have legitimacy,

50. Calnan, supra note 6.
51. Ibid.
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an NGO may invest greatly in structures that validate its stance,
whereas efficiency would dictate fast decision-making.
4. Sources of money capital for an NGO can be either constraining or
liberating in terms of their effects on its tactics. Calnan’s view is that
funding dictates choices, and that, at times, the lack of funding or
the restrictions on a prescribed funding source may limit an NGO’s
effectiveness.52
Calnan’s work is interesting because he has endeavoured to give a mark of
effectiveness to the NGOs that he has studied and to deepen our knowledge of
the variety of factors that impact effectiveness. He acknowledges that his work
provides only a partial account of effectiveness due to his lack of access to some
data. Thus, Calnan’s work only gives a snapshot-in-time assessment of the various
organizations he considers. Nevertheless, his model provides some additional
elements to my framework for NGO evaluation.
Calnan and others provide a variety of tools to assess effectiveness. Many
reflect the assessment of effectiveness of other influential players such as
ombudsmen. It is noteworthy that Calnan and Collingwood both recognize
that effectiveness may be present in a negative political environment. Even if the
audience is not listening, the message may still be well delivered. Slim and others
may disagree with that assessment. The real measure of effectiveness rests in the
ability to influence powerful actors and the ability to find the appropriate way to
do so. It is not enough to put up a good fight; winning is important. In the next
section, I propose an evaluation model for advocacy NGOs that draws on the
inventory of criteria listed above.

III. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
There are certain features that a national human rights and civil liberties watchdog
organization should monitor to assess its worth, legitimacy, effectiveness, and
strategic choices. In the following section, I propose criteria to measure the work
of an advocacy organization drawing on the ideas explored above. The model
has two main components, legitimacy and efficiency, recognizing that both are
interrelated and must be present in the context of an NGO’s work.
A. LEGITIMACY

NGOs claim legitimacy. They should. In my view, their role in a democratic
society is important. How they assert this legitimacy must be theorized. The
52. Ibid at 325-26.
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following proposal suggests that legitimacy is gained through three essential
factors: transparency, independence, and expertise. I suggest that each factor
enhances the overall legitimacy of an NGO’s voice, and that the three factors are
interdependent. That is, more transparency leads to more independence, greater
expertise adds to the perception of independence, and independence is essential
to the assertion of expertise.
1.

TRANSPARENCY

It seems clear that while representativeness in the democratic sense (i.e., elections
or direct participation) may not be essential to an NGO’s legitimacy, transparency
is. NGOs must make it clear how they function, for whom, and to whom they
deem themselves accountable.
As a social movement draws its power from a group’s commitment, an
NGO draws its influence from its capacity to speak. The power to speak can be
challenged, and the ability to demonstrate a credible process or a meaningful
reflection is essential to the exercise of that power. Ombudsmen benefit from
the transparency afforded by a legislative mandate that is publicly available. Slim
certainly suggests that transparency is both necessary and the most important
defence against “masquerading.” Although Calnan does not use the concept of
transparency as frequently, he emphasizes the process by which an organization
determines its agenda. He also criticizes NGOs for failing to be transparent about
their evaluation processes.
What would transparency require? It seems that public disclosure of an NGO’s
decision-making structure and sources of funding is essential. Transparency may
also require that an NGO’s policy positions and advocacy stances also be disclosed.
The identity of donors is a more delicate question. Does it matter whether the
person is a major donor and known to the organization? Is it sufficient to state
that there are anonymous donors to the organization? At a minimum, the issue
must be addressed and the policy made public. Identifying the decision-making
structure clearly and publicly can allay the fear that a particular donor may be
able to influence decision-making within the organization.
2.

INDEPENDENCE

The ability to contribute to public discourse in an impartial way contributes to
legitimacy. Though this does not mean an NGO must take a neutral position,
independence is necessary to demonstrate how an NGO’s voice is distinct
from that of political parties or other powerful actors. This criterion relates to
transparency in the sense that transparency about processes and funding may
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supersede a demonstration of absolute independence and impartiality, which
is impossible to achieve. In other words, an NGO could have a bias in favour
of social justice or civil liberties without sacrificing its legitimacy. However, it
must demonstrate integrity in its findings and actions: it ought not to be easily
manipulated or used by political actors.
In that sense, independence draws on research related to both social
movements and ombudsmen. The literature identifies cooptation as a source of
failure and a major danger for social movements. In that sense, the ability to
maintain independence is linked to keeping the dangers of cooptation at bay.
There is no doubt that ombudsmen cherish their independence and view it as the
most important aspect of their legitimacy and ability to contribute meaningfully
to public debates. Similarly, the research on NGOs also points to independence
and non-partisanship as essential to credibility. The ability to demonstrate
independence, not simply to claim it, is necessary. The diversity of sources of
funding and the ability to criticize governments of all stripes should be apparent
to all. Expertise
Demonstrating expertise enhances legitimacy. The expertise of an
organization or the people associated with it is crucial to legitimacy. In what
follows, I analyze two types of expertise in the context of legal advocacy NGOs:
factual accuracy and democratic analysis.
3.

FACTUAL ACCURACY

Truth fosters legitimacy and, in that sense, accuracy of information must be
ensured. There is no doubt that truth is difficult to assess and that there is a
continuous battle to establish it. Nevertheless, trust is in short supply and to the
extent that an NGO participates in a watchdog enterprise, it must attempt to
bring the “truth” out into the open.
Although the strength of social movements is not about demonstrating
expertise in the traditional sense as much as expressing outrage or denunciation,
one can argue that the correctness of the facts presented by NGOs plays an
important role. The moral claim that is asserted by NGOs often pertains to
untold truths, the hidden costs of social policies, or silenced suffering. Many
social movements, like the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, the
gay-lesbian movement, and the Occupy movement, are about denouncing
discrimination and unfairness. Similarly, ombudsmen have investigatory powers
to ascertain the truth of a complaint, as well as access to information to ensure
that their findings are accurate.
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NGOs should strive to ensure that they have factually correct information.
This is not always easy. Access to government information is notoriously
labour-intensive and often untimely. Systematic analysis may be impeded by
the lack of reliable data. In that sense, NGOs should foster partnerships with
universities and other institutions capable of establishing credible research
protocols. However, truth is not only claimed by numbers, reliable statistical
analysis, or longitudinal studies. Lived unfairness also needs to be disclosed.
Testimonies can be made available and individual stories of abuse can be very
compelling. The test for accuracy becomes the diagnosis that is attached to
the story: is it an abhorrent tale? Unusual? Or is it representative of a systemic
problem?
The issue of diagnosis is of fundamental importance. At times, it is impossible
to tell whether an outrageous story is representative of a trend or an isolated
occurrence. In such cases, access to data and academic expertise are needed.
Nevertheless, the uncovering of individual injustices, however exceptional,
uncommon, or abnormal, is still a worthwhile enterprise. Justice is not attained
at an abstract level. The presumption of innocence must be applied to individual
cases. It is not good enough that, in general, most people are treated appropriately
by the justice system. Justice aspires to a perfect score; wrongful convictions, even
if counted in single digits, are unacceptable.
4.

DEMOCRATIC ASSESSMENT

In this section, I purposely use the term democratic assessment as opposed to legal
accuracy or public interest analysis. If a legal mandate is what gives legitimacy
to an organization, as Slim seems to suggest, the organization must be rigorous
about the law and complement the fact-finding aspect with a legal assessment
that stands a good chance to be borne out in any eventual litigation. However,
law is in constant evolution and there may be times when the current rules are
unsatisfactory. In addition, the commitment to international values of human
rights may not have been fully reflected in national legislative instruments,
or simply ignored in a given situation. Reasonable people may disagree about
the interpretation of the law in a particular context. Within the ambit of legal
interpretation, one would hope generally not to stray too far outside the bounds of
expected legal pronouncements. Nevertheless, legal accuracy may be insufficient
to claim the moral imprimatur that seems to be needed to assert influence outside
of legal circles.
Although the legal community may be an important ally in the fight to
ensure compliance with human rights (whether internationally mandated
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or constitutionally enshrined), it may not be enough to influence the public
or politicians. Some people are dismayed by the prospects of illegality or
unconstitutionality, but others may want to understand why the legal world is so
adamant about protecting such values. A truly democratic society is not secure
simply because the legal world is able to protect the rule of law; a democracy must
aim to have the entire society committed to upholding its underlying principles
in rational and conscious ways. As society experiences a “decline in deference,”53
it cannot be expected to simply abide by the words of experts. The art form is
to explain why respect for legal norms is democratically and morally required, as
well as in the public interest.
The legitimacy debate will continue to dominate the assessment of NGOs’
participation in various arenas. NGOs claim legitimacy to participate in these
arenas whenever they are invited to speak on Parliament Hill to support or oppose
a bill, when they seek intervener status before tribunals and courts, and when they
issue media statements. Calnan’s work invites NGOs to be more self-reflective
as to how this claim is made, while Slim’s analysis suggests that transparency
must be at the core of all legitimacy claims. In my view, the legitimacy claimed
must be grounded in expertise, transparency, and independence. The legitimacy
challenge is unique to NGOs but it must be shouldered energetically and with
imagination. The self-analysis and self-reflection recommended by Calnan must
be constantly undertaken.
It is also important to assess the effectiveness of NGOs, an issue to which I
turn in the next section.
B. EFFECTIVENESS

In this section, I engage more fully with the idea of measuring effectiveness in
light of the analysis provided above. I explore themes that, in my view, bring
the discussion of effectiveness into the realm of actual choices made daily by
NGOs. My objective is to see whether a discussion of effectiveness enriched by
the inventory of measurement criteria can shed light on some of the dilemmas
that face NGOs. I propose to discuss two main issues: whether NGOs should
claim that they are “causing” change and how they should attempt to resolve the
choice between long-term and short-term strategies.

53. The expression comes from Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in
Cross-National Perspective (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1995).
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1.

“CAUSING” CHANGE?

The primary way in which advocacy organizations assess their effectiveness is
by claiming a causal role in bringing about change. Ideally, effectiveness would
be measured by changes attributable to an NGO’s actions: changes in the law,
changes in public opinion, or changes in practices. A causal connection is
certainly difficult to establish. Calnan’s work explains how the search for such
a causal connection is destined to fail because most advocacy efforts operate at
the margins and create change in small increments over a lengthy period of time.
The literature on ombudsmen is helpful in this regard because ombudsmen
view themselves as agents of change. The ombudsman’s strategy is one of leveraging
the credibility of his or her office, coupled with ongoing lobbying, credible
findings, and workable recommendations. Some NGOs benefit from a similar
position, where their findings are viewed as credible and their recommendations
worthy of a reaction. When soft advocacy and the power of words do not suffice,
advocacy NGOs will resort to legal action with a view to effect change. Joel
Handler famously concluded that resorting to courts is a sign of weakness, of an
inability to exert influence where it matters—in politics, in administration, or in
the market.54 Only moderate success is to be expected from court action. Indeed,
many suggest that litigation is useless and even detrimental to the achievement
of equality and civil rights.55
I do not hold these views. In my view, there are two aspects of litigation
that are overlooked by this grim evaluation. First, litigation is voice; it is the
occupation of a public sphere that demands recognition. Many recognize the
power to raise consciousness by using rights language. There is a certain powerful
democratization when groups and people discuss law and suggest what the right
law should be. This empowerment through claiming the space of law ought not
to be dismissed. In addition, the courtroom may appear as inaccessible as the
boardroom of a corporation or the ballroom of an expensive hotel, and this is
precisely why it must be seized and occupied by claims of ordinary people.
Second, litigation is unavoidable. Most civil liberties or human rights laws
are essentially defensive: they are a response to the attempt to use law to impose
silence, to impose punishment, or to enforce rules. Indeed, many civil liberties
arguments are brought in the context of state actions against an individual
in criminal law or in immigration law. At times, civil liberties arguments will
be brought in defense of actions by powerful actors using defamation suits to
54. Joel Handler, Social Movements and the Legal System: A Theory of Law Reform and Social
Change (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1978).
55. Ibid.

DES ROSIERS, AN EVALUATION MODEL 915

silence dissent or trademark law to impose restraints. To the extent that there
are proactive lawsuits that seek to change the law, they ought to be analysed in
different categories: claims that challenge existing criminal or immigration laws
that could be used against individuals or claims that object to recent amendments
that some consider unconstitutional. In both cases, the litigation strategy is
essentially aimed at stopping allegedly abusive state action.
In that context, the special role of NGO lawyers must be discussed. Legal
advocacy could be criticized as disempowering and disabling as opposed to
enabling poor and vulnerable people. The fear is that lawyers will take over
the agenda and, as Wexler so appropriately denounced in 1970,56 devise legal
strategies as though poor people were rich people without money, and fail to
recognize the power dynamics. There is a danger that litigation strategies may
create a dependency on legal experts and fail to empower people to organize
politically. Special attention must be paid to this possibility and lawyers need
to be particularly conscious of the danger that they might disable or slow down
mobilization campaigns. Special lawyering skills are needed in the NGO context.
The work demands versatility, an ability to move from the courtroom to the
media room, the community centre, the school and the parliamentary hearing.
Further research on the ethical concerns raised by this multiplicity of roles is
certainly needed.
In addition, the analysis of whether a long-term goal ought to supplant a
short-term victory is often at stake: litigation may require the manipulation of
legal precedents that are, at times, unsympathetic to human rights concerns. One
could imagine a legal theory that fully embraces human rights principles, like a
fulsome respect for socio-economic rights. Instead, one could opt for recognition
that the current caselaw is paralysed on the question and develop a different legal
argument, one that seeks to secure progress but not propose the ultimate legal
analysis that would fully support a vigorous human rights vision. This tension is
real. On the one hand, the possibility of under-arguing a human rights analysis
is dangerous—it might preserve an inadequate and unsatisfactory precedent,
have widespread repercussions, and represent a missed opportunity that might
not return. On the other hand, disregarding the status quo of the law and the
typically slow pace of legal change may result in vital concerns being dismissed
or ignored. Courts may simply pay no attention to arguments that stretch the
current caselaw too far or clearly call for overruling a pre-existing case. The legal
strategy is often confronted with such dilemmas, which are discussed in the next
section.
56. Wexler, supra note 10.
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2.

SHORT TERM VERSUS LONG TERM

Most advocacy NGOs view themselves as being in the business for the long
term. They often argue that short-term political expediency will have detrimental
consequences. However, immediate needs must be met and current injustices
must be addressed. Whether it is the release of people detained for breach of
peace, immediate changes of abusive bail conditions, or the release of information
about police surveillance in a particular locale, such issues deserve to be fully
aired. Transparency values suggest that any short-term fight should be linked to
a long-term advocacy position and supported by analysis that identifies how the
short-term position enhances the NGO’s capacity to achieve its long-term goals.
Calnan’s work in this respect is very helpful. He challenges NGOs to
become more self-reflexive, to bring clarity to their work, and to engage fully
in goal identification. In his view, the capacity to publicly and transparently
acknowledge and evaluate strategic choices is essential to developing a sustainable
agenda. In a way, Calnan invites NGOs to enlarge their focus and assess the
range of strategies that are open to them, not only in terms of mobilization,
public education, media outreach, lobbying, or litigation, but also in terms of
the goal that is sought. For example, some would argue that a solution-oriented,
reasonable NGO may be more efficient if it is prepared to develop solutions for
the government faced with human rights violations. But this is not always clear.
At times, anger creation, without offering a solution, may also be a legitimate
strategy that galvanizes the will for action. The choice between solution-oriented
strategies and anger-creation ought to be acknowledged and evaluated. Proposing
a solution may be a short-term, expedient goal, while sustaining a campaign that
expresses outrage may lead to more profound long-term changes and may build
more emotional attachment to the fight for human rights or civil liberties.
Finally, the short-term versus long-term dilemma is also raised in the choice
between grassroots advocacy and elite leveraging. Both are common strategies
for NGOs and both have benefits. There is no shame in attempting to convince
the powerful to relinquish some power, to care more about social issues, and
to engage in more altruistic behaviour. The danger that lurks is the cooptation
or legitimation that comes from participating in processes that seek to appease
wrongdoers without resolving the issues, as highlighted in the literature on social
movements.57 This suggests that NGOs must engage in self-reflection to prevent
being manipulated by “symbolic reassurance.”58
57. See supra note 20.
58. Dobson, supra note 18.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The field of assessment of NGOs’ strategies is highly politicized, and rightly so.
People demand a certain degree of virtue from those who criticize others. The
advocacy function in a democracy is well served by a vibrant NGO sector that
is self-critical and self-searching, and attempts to evaluate and reflect on its flaws
and quandaries. This article has discussed the effectiveness of domestic advocacy
NGOs in comparison with the success indicators developed in the context of
social movements, ombudsmen, and international NGOs or domestic NGOs
engaged in ensuring compliance with international standards. It proposes a
framework for assessing the performance of NGOs.
The main contribution of the research undertaken and the proposed
framework lies in identifying the transparency and self-reflexivity requirements
needed to achieve effectiveness. In my view, effectiveness is enhanced by
independence, expertise, and resources (including financial resources, as well as
access to networks). It must also be grounded in a requirement of transparency,
which confers meaningful credibility, and in on-going analysis or self-reflexivity,
which entails continuous assessment of strategic choices to determine their link
to long-term goals. Evidence of causal connections between an NGO’s action
and change, in the form of governmental response or court ruling, will always
be difficult to obtain; influence may or may not be acknowledged. Nevertheless,
advocacy NGOs should aim to clarify for themselves why they choose certain
strategies and accept that their claim to influence requires a commitment to
transparency, not unlike the commitment that they require from governments.
Calnan suggests that more research ought to be done on the roles and
strategies that NGOs develop. I agree. The constant struggle to work and survive
that characterizes most NGOs leaves little time for reflection, which is why
academics need to pay attention to NGOs and help them. The CCLA would not
have prospered as it did but for the patient attention that John McCamus gave to
it. We were fortunate to have several academics who cared about the endeavour
and brought rigour and imagination to the task. Personally, I am particularly
grateful for the opportunity that has been provided by Osgoode Hall Law School
to delve into the question of assessment of the performance of advocacy NGOs.

